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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : CaseNo.20050678-CA 
AZHARN ALFATLAWI, 
Defendant/Appellant : 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant/Appellant Azharn Alfatlawi, through counsel, replies to arguments 
newly raised in the Brief of Appellee. Point I addresses the state's miscomprehension of 
the burden for showing harm when the error is one of constitutional magnitude. Point II 
rebuts the argument that the failure to give an elements instruction for group criminal 
activity was somehow harmless even though the jury's verdict on that issue added 
twenty-eight additional years to Mr. Alfatlawi's minimum sentence. Point III addresses 
the state's mistaken contention that a sentenced lengthened in violation of double 
jeopardy protections may not be reviewed pursuant to the doctrine of either ineffective 
assistance of counsel or exceptional circumstances. 
POINT I: AN ERROR OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
DEMANDS REVERSAL UNLESS IT IS PROVED BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ERROR CAUSED NO 
HARM. 
The Brief of Appellee miscomprehends the burden of establishing harm in the 
context of ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error when the error is one of 
constitutional magnitude. Point I first describes the correct standard. Point I then applies 
the correct standard to the failure to investigate juror bias {infra § A), the failure to 
preserve the presumption of innocence until rendering a final verdict {infra § B), and the 
unconstitutional reliance upon Mr. Alfatlawfs race and nationality as aggravating 
sentencing factors {infra § C). 
Where a defendant's constitutional rights have been violated, any result derived 
from the violation must be reversed unless the violation is proved harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2002 UT App 49,1f 10, 42 P.3d 1261 (failure 
to submit fact questions to jury); State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, % 11, 975 P.2d 469 
{Miranda violation); Stale v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(failure to suppress illegally obtained evidence). The harmless error standard is far more 
demanding than, for example, the standard applied to insufficient evidence claims: 
It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction even if the statement is excised from the record. It is 
inconsequential that a retrial will most likely result in a conviction. 
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" requires the highest level of certainty known 
to our legal system in the resolution of a disputed factual matter." 
State v. Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
An accused is constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). An accused claiming ineffective 
assistance "'must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" 
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State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 23, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 
72,1(19, 61 P.3d 978). 
If deficient representation results in a violation of a constitutional right, the 
prejudice leg of the test is satisfied unless it is proved harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 980-81. 
In Gallegos, the court determined that counsel provided deficient representation in 
failing to renew at trial a motion to suppress evidence when it became clear the evidence 
was collected in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The court 
analyzed the prejudice leg of the test by deciding whether counsel's failure to assert 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The 
court concluded that, even though the evidence in question may well have been 
cumulative of other evidence supporting the guilty verdict, the error was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 981. The court remanded to determine if the 
conviction should be vacated. Id. 
The harmless error standard also applies to the plain error test, if the error is of 
constitutional dimension. Plain error occurs where (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain, 
and (3) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights. E.g., State v. Eldredge, 113 
P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989). When the error involves violation of a federal constitutional 
right, the "substantial rights" leg of the plain error test is satisfied, and the outcome must 
be reversed, unless the state proves the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Verde^ 770 P.2d 117, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Hackford, 131 P.2d 
200, 204 (Utah 1987)). 
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A. Counsel's and the Court's Failure to Explore Juror Bias Was Not 
Harmless beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury. A failure to explore even an 
inference of bias threatens that constitutional right, along with other "fundamental 
rights." State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). A juror's connection 
to a job similar 1o that held by a trial witness raises an inference of bias. See Depew v. 
Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, ^ 17, 71 P.3d 601. Thus, such a connection raises at least an 
inference of harm; to wit, the violation of one's constitutional right to an impartial jury. 
See Br. Aplt. at 19-20,23. 
Juror 10's daughter's job with "Utah patrols" raises an inference of bias because 
no fewer than six law enforcement officers testified at trial. Counsel provided deficient 
representation, and the court erred in failing to explore the inference because, where voir 
dire "revealed a potential for bias, the trial judge was required to address the potential 
bias through rehabilitative inquiry until this inference or question was rebutted." 
Woolley, 810 P.2d at 444 (internal quotations omitted). 
The Brief of Appellee fails to marshal evidence or prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the failure to explore the inference that juror 10 might be biased was harmless. 
Compare Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 981 n.6 (vacating conviction, and noting that "the State 
did not address the question of harmless error in its briefing. We therefore do not have 
the advantage of the State's analysis to aid us."). 
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B. The Failure to Preserve the Presumption of Innocence before a Final 
Verdict Was Rendered Was Not Harmless beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
The state concedes that chaining and shackling an accused at a critical stage of the 
trial violates his constitutional rights. The Constitution guarantees an accused due 
process, including the presumption of innocence. Br. Applee. at 33 (citing Holbrook v. 
Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986); State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)). "Visible shackling before the jury may infringe on that right by indirectly 
commenting on a defendant's status, guilt, or dangerousness." Id. at 33 (citing Holbrook, 
475 U.S. at 568; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970)). 
The state also concedes that the law prohibiting a defendant from appearing before 
a jury in prison garb is equally applicable to chains and shackles. 'This is because 
shackling, like compelling a defendant to stand trial in jail clothes, may unmistakably 
brand the defendant as guilty or so dangerous that he must be separated from the 
community at large." Id. (citing Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569). In Utah, allowing a 
defendant to appear before a jury at a critical stage of the proceeding in prison garb 
constitutes plain error. See Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 344-45 (Utah 1980). 
However, the state mistakenly seeks to burden Mr. Alfatlawi with proving he was 
prejudiced by this error of constitutional magnitude. It argues that Mr. Alfatlawi has 
failed to prove prejudice because, perhaps, the jurors did not see him chained and 
shackled. Applee. Br. at 34-35. Undisputed, however, is that the chains and shackles 
were visible to the jury. R. 343:437. The state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury, as one, failed to notice the clearly visible chains and shackles prior to 
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rendering a final verdict. It does not begin to explain how something as extraordinary as 
a fellow human sitting nearby in chains and shackles would escape notice. 
The state also errs in asserting that the chaining and shackling occurred after a 
final verdict was rendered. Applee. Br. at 35. An accused in Utah may not be convicted 
except upon a unanimous jury verdict. Utah Const, art. I, § 10; see Aplt. Br. at 30-31. A 
unanimous jury verdict is not finally rendered until the accused, if he so demands, polls 
each individual juror: "A criminal defendant's right to poll the jury is a corollary to the 
defendant's right to a unanimous verdict." State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, ^ 13, 999 P.2d 565 
(citing 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 1293 (1998)). In short, there is no unanimous 
verdict, and thus no verdict or conviction, until each juror is polled. See Id. *| 13-14. The 
state has cited no facts to prove the undisputed violation of Mr. Alfatlawi's constitutional 
rights to fair trial and the presumption of innocence at critical stages was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
C. The State Cannot Prove Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Court's 
Consideration of Defendant's Race and Nationality Did Not Affect the 
Sentence Imposed. 
Due process requires that a sentence be based upon "reasonably reliable and 
relevant information." Stale v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). These rights 
stem from both the state and federal constitutions. Id. Race and nationality are 
"constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process." See Zant 
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (stating that unconstitutional and irrelevant factors 
include "for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant"); compare 
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 275-76 (1937) (Van Devanter, J., dissenting) (urging 
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that conviction for attempting to incite an uprising be affirmed because, inter alia, the 
defendant was a "negro," as were those he addressed, and the literature at issue was such 
that this audience in particular would give "unusual credence to its inflaming and inciting 
features"). See Br. Aplt. at 46-48. 
Contrary to the Brief of Appellee, at 48-49, the court plainly erred in emphasizing 
Mr. Alfatlawi's race and nationality, and in expressing an obvious and strong sense of 
betrayal based thereon. As a starting point, the state effectively concedes the court's 
comments about Mr. Alfatlawi's Iraqi heritage occurred during consideration of factors 
relevant to imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences. Id. at 48. 
Then, assuming for the sake of argument, only, that Mr. Alfatlawi's race and 
nationality might somehow constitute appropriate sentencing considerations, the general 
law regarding refugees and asylum must be understood to appreciate the court's 
fundamental misunderstandings - and its inappropriate conclusions based thereon. A 
grant of asylum is either mandated or prohibited based upon specific factors and exacting 
procedures. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b) (2006) ("Conditions for granting asylum"). 
The criteria and, in fact, much of the language used in federal asylum provisions, derive 
from international treaty obligations set forth in The United Nations Convention Relating 
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to the Status of Refugees, art. I (1951).l Ministerial grace plays no role in asylum 
proceedings. A refugee residing in the United States "owes" no more or less to the 
country than does any other resident. 
The only information in the Presentence Sentence Report (R. 298A) about Mr. 
Alfatlawi's immigration to the United States is as follows: 
The defendant was born in Najai, Iraq, and has very little recollection of his 
life in Iraq. According to his mother and sibling, daily life in Iraq was 
wrought with poverty and war. The defendant reportedly witnessed 
violence and death on a frequent basis. When the defendant was seven years 
of age, he and his family came to the United States as political refugees. 
Id. at 15. The same report notes that the INS refused to deport Mr. Alfatlawi in 2004. 
Id at 12. 
1
 Article 1 of the Convention defines a refugee as follows: 
A person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; 
has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and 
is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that 
country, or to return there, for fear of persecution. 
United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137. 
2
 The presentence report cited the constitutionally impermissible factor of political belief 
amongst factors arguing for imposition of consecutive sentences: 
In addition, he tattooed the words "Iraqi Pride'* on his forehead, while the 
United States is at war in the country of Iraq. The possibilities of Mr. 
Alfatlawi gaining meaningful employment is doubtful. If Mr. Alfatlawi was 
to become a successful and participating member of society while on parole, 
he would have to undergo a major behavioral transformation as well as the 
removal of the tattoos on his face. (R. 298A, Presentence Report at 4 (ital. 
in original).) 
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Yet, the sentencing court, based upon nothing further, "assume[d]" Mr. Alfatlawi 
came to the United States due to his personal conflict with the ruler of Iraq. R. 344:9 (the 
entire sentencing transcript is attached as Addendum M to the Brief of Appellee). In fact, 
the record contains no information about the basis for which asylum was granted to his 
parents when Mr. Alfatlawi was only seven years old. The court assumed, based upon 
nothing further, that, but for asylum, Mr. Alfatlawi "would probably be in one of those 
mass graves over there." Id. Again, nothing in the record supports this inference. 
From these unsupported inferences, the court concluded that Mr. Alfatlawi 
somehow betrayed the United States and its citizens by engaging in criminal conduct after 
being granted asylum by the good will and grace of its citizenry: 
But what we did in this country, we gave you political asylum, we allowed 
you to come here, along with your family, and enjoy the benefits of living in 
this country. And what thanks has this country got for it? We got someone 
who commits crimes, goes to prison, has been -
Id, See also id. ("You come over here, take advantage of that. . ."). 
The court's indignation and sense of betrayal were not based upon reliable 
information. Rather, they stemmed from consideration of unconstitutional and irrelevant 
factors, as well as a fundamental misunderstanding of the facts and of federal law. The 
reason for Mr. Alfatlawi's presence in the United States is not relevant to imposing 
1
 Rendering the court's consideration of unconstitutional and irrelevant factors more 
obvious still were its uniformed comments about Iraq, such as, "If that's the kind of 
people we got over in Iraq, maybe we ought to get out." R. 344:10. And, "It is too bad 
we can't deport [Ms. Alfatlawi] back to Iraq. If I had any say-so about it, that's exactly 
where he would go, and he can deal with the situation over there. He would last about 
twenty minutes, with his attitude." Id. at 11. 
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sentence. Mr. Alfatlawi's parents' reasons for leaving Iraq do not bear upon Mr. 
Alfatlawi's culpability, acceptance of responsibility, potential for rehabilitation. This 
history, the current state of affairs in Iraq, and Mr. Alfatlawi's heritage are not properly 
considered as mitigating or aggravating sentencing factors. The court's indignation and 
sense of betrayal were wholly misplaced. The court plainly erred, and violated Mr. 
Alfatlawi's constitutional due process rights by relying upon unconstitutional, unreliable 
and irrelevant factors in sentencing Mr. Alfatlawi. 
The state, therefore, is burdened with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
error was harmless. Pointing out that Mr. Alfatlawi was very disrespectful, and 
speculating whether the court voiced its sense of indignation and betrayal in a calm voice 
(Br. Applee. at 45, 48), does not carry this, the heaviest of burdens assessed in American 
jurisprudence. 
POINT II: FAILURE TO GIVE AN ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION FOR 
GROUP CRIMINAL ACTIVITY REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
Failure to submit the elements of group criminal liability to a jury to determine 
whether each element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt violates a defendant's 
constitutional rights. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, K 17, 980 P.2d 191; see Br. Aplt. at 27-
29. This error, therefore, requires reversal unless the state proves beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error was harmless. See supra pp. 1-10. This standard applies both to 
ineffective assistance and plain error analysis. Id. 
Contrary to the Brief of Appellee, at 29-30, failure to give an elements instruction 
for group criminal activity may be challenged either as ineffective assistance of counsel, 
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or plain or manifest error. The state concedes the former. Id. at 29. In an opinion 
addressing the same statute at issue herein, this court recognizes the latter: 
The State contends any error in sentencing defendant under the gang 
enhancement statute was harmless. We disagree. The trial court did not 
instruct the jury that it must first find criminal culpability for the three actors 
before defendant could receive an enhanced penalty. "'Failure to give an 
elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard 
under [Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure] 19(c) and constitutes reversible 
error as a matter of law."5 State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (quoting State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995)) (alteration in original). 
State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, *{ 49 n.10, 993 P.2d 232. 
The state's reliance upon State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, 132 P.3d 703 is 
unavailing. There, the state charged both individual and accomplice liability. Malaga, 
2006 UT App 103, ^  14-15. At trial, however, the state made no attempt to prove 
accomplice liability. Id. Accordingly, this court observed, "[A] defendant cannot show 
prejudice where as here, the allegedly erroneous instructions were 'superfluous and not 
the basis of the jury's verdict.'" Id. at \ 14 (quoting State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 198 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Here, by contrast, group criminal liability was charged, submitted 
to the jury (albeit without an elements instruction), and resulted in an additional twenty-
eight (28) years in prison. R. 296-98, 
Counsel's failure to protect Mr. Alfatlawi's constitutional right to have every 
element of a crime proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, see Lopes, 1999 UT 24, <|J 
17, constitutes ineffective assistance. See Br. Aplt. at 27-29. The court's failure to ensure 
that the jury received an elements instruction constitutes plain or manifest error. Leleae, 
1999 UT App 368, \ 49 n. 10; see Br. Aplt. at 29. 
ll 
The state argues that there was no need to request or provide an elements 
instruction for group criminal activity because Mr. Alfatlawi's defense to the underlying 
crime was that he did not commit the crimes, either alone or with others. Br. Applee. at 
30. This argument is without legal basis. See Lopes, 1999 UT 24, \ 17 (failure to instruct 
as to elements of group criminal liability violates defendant's constitutional rights). 
Moreover, this argument simply makes no sense. That Mr. Alfatlawi denied primary 
culpability docs not mean he conceded guilt to group criminal activity. It goes without 
saying that finding primary culpability is a prerequisite to a conviction for group criminal 
activity. In fact, the jury was instructed to first determine Mr. Alfatlawi's primary 
culpability, and then whether he committed the crimes in concert with others. See R. 292 
- SEALED (special verdict form). This was a decision by which twenty-eight (28) years 
were added to Mr. Alfatlawi's minimum sentence; thus an important decision it was. The 
state fails its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to provide an 
elements decision (which itself constitutes manifest error) was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
POINT III: THIS COURT MAY REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF SECTION 76-3-203.8 PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINES 
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND EXTRAORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Counsel provides deficient representation by failing to argue an open question of 
state law {infra § A). The extraordinary circumstances doctrine permits review of 
question of constitutional dimension erroneously resolved by the trial court to add seven 
years to Mr. Alfatlawi's minimum prison sentence {infra § B). 
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A. Counsel Is Ineffective for Failing to Argue an Open Question of State Law. 
Far more is required of a constitutionally effective defense attorney than merely 
arguing what is settled law. Compare Br. Applee. at 36-37. In fact, where there is an 
open legal question, and its ultimate resolution would benefit a client, defense counsel 
provides deficient representation by not raising it. See State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, j^ 32, 
135 P.3d 864. In Ison9 an administrative law judge ("ALJ") issued findings and 
conclusions that undermined the criminal charges subsequently filed against the 
defendant. Id, at ^ 30. The state argued that because the admissibility of the ALJ's 
findings pursuant to Utah rule of evidence 803(8)(C) remained an open question in Utah 
courts, defense counsel could not provide ineffective assistance for failing to seek their 
admission. The Supreme Court disagreed: 
We are not persuaded that Mr. Ison's counsel can be excused for not 
seeking to introduce the ALJ's findings because the issue of whether the 
ALJ report came within rule 803(8)(C) was an open question in our courts. 
Mr. Ison would have alerted his counsel that the ALJ had exonerated him of 
charges that he had violated the Consumer Sales Practices Act. . . . Surely, 
competent counsel would scour the exceptions to the hearsay rule in search 
of a means to place the findings in the hands of the jury. 
Id. at |^ 32. 
Whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-203.8 constitutionally imposes a second 
punishment for the same act is an open question of law in Utah. See Br. Aplt. at 34-36. 
Prior to 1995, the weapons enhancement statute (then codified at § 76-3-201(1)) required 
enhancement upon use of a "firearm." Double jeopardy challenges to the pre-1995 
"firearm" enhancement were rejected precisely because the enhancement statute 
addressed firearms, while the aggravating factor for robbery and burglary was use of a 
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dangerous weapon, not a firearm. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 85-87 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In each case, therefore, it was the difference between the underlying offense and 
the enhancement statute that saved the latter. 
The current version of the enhancement statute no longer refers to "firearm." It 
refers to "dangerous weapon.5' A difference no longer exists between the weapons 
enhancement statute and the aggravated burglary and robbery statutes. The question of 
whether the same act, / e., use of a dangerous weapon, may raise robbery and burglary 
charges to aggravated first-degree felonies, and compel harsher punishment a second time 
by enhancing those aggravated offenses is obvious: Is it constitutional to punish an 
accused twice for the same act? The question, in fact, is so open that Utah Supreme Court 
sua sponte raised it in a case where cumulative punishment for the same criminal act was 
not at issue, and was briefed by neither party. State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, ^ 2 n.2, 122 
P.3d 571 (noting, without deciding, the issue of whether aggravated robbery may still be 
enhanced by the post-1995 "dangerous weapons" statute). 
Moreover, Mr. Alfatlawi does not concede that the question is closed by federal 
precedent. Contrast Br. Applee. at 36. Only where enhancing punishment for the same 
underlying criminal act is "specifically authorized by Congress" may two punishments 
for the same act survive double jeopardy challenge. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 
367 (1983) (emphasis in original) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 
(1980)). Absent such unmistakable legislative intent, two punishments for the same act 
are impermissible: "[WJhere the offenses are the same . . . cumulative sentences are not 
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permitted." Id. (brackets and ellipses in original). Because the legislature is presumed to 
know that the difference in language is what saved the pre-1995 enhancement statute 
from double jeopardy challenges, it must have appreciated the significance of the 1995 
amendment that eliminated the difference. Therefore, after 1995, legislative intent to 
authorize double punishment for the same act was anything but clear. Pursuant to the 
Fifth Amendment, after 1995, counsel was ineffective and the court committed plain error 
in not recognizing this federal constitutional violation. 
Contrary to the state's argument, "clairvoyance" was not required to recognize this 
issue. Br. Applee. at 39 (citing Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
Merely paying attention - where as here the accused was facing an effective life sentence 
- would have been enough. 
B. The Extraordinary Circumstances Doctrine Compels Consideration of the 
Double Jeopardy Issue. 
If not reached pursuant to the doctrine of ineffective counsel, the doctrine of 
extraordinary circumstances compels review of Mr. Alfatlawi's federal-based and state-
based constitutional double jeopardy challenges. See Br. Applee. at 41-42. "[T]he 
extraordinary circumstances doctrine applies to 'rare procedural anomalies.5" State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^ 23, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1209 n.3 (Utah 1993)). It is utilized "where our failure to consider an issue that was not 
properly preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." Id. 
Undisputed is that serving additional time in prison based upon a violation of 
constitutional double jeopardy guarantees constitutes a manifest injustice. The state 
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responds that reviewing this constitutional violation pursuant to the extraordinary 
circumstances doctrine would merely constitute an end run around the burdens imposed 
under the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel. Br. Applee. at 39 n.13. 
However, the state also argues that there can be no ineffective assistance for failing 
to assert an unsettled question of law. If there was no ineffective assistance, and if the 
defendant is serving a prison sentence based upon a possible error of constitutional 
magnitude, then these are precisely the exceptional circumstances under which review is 
necessary to avoid manifest injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
If the court finds ineffective assistance of counsel, the convictions should be 
vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. A new trial is also required if this court 
finds the trial court erroneously failed to investigate juror bias, caution the jury regarding 
accomplice testimony, failed to adequately define or set forth the elements of group 
criminal activity, or preserve Mr. Alfatlawi's right to a presumption of innocence. If this 
court finds that the dangerous weapon statute is unconstitutional as applied, the illegal 
sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for new sentencing proceedings. If 
this court finds that consecutive sentences were imposed based upon unconstitutional, 
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irrelevant or inaccurate information, or from anger and bias, the illegal sentence should 
be vacated and the case remanded for new sentencing proceedings. 
DATED this JJQ_ day of August, 2006 
John Pace 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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